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I. Introduction
Following World War II, the industrialized nations of theWest committed
themselves to the creation of liberal international trade and investment
policies. Such policies were considered essential to economic recovery and
growth. Free market policies also responded to the belief that protectionist
activities

governmental

and

private

trade

restraints

had

contributed

to an

international environment thatultimately led to theWar1.
In

order

nations

to minimize
a

created

international

Western
developed
to
and
system2
agreed

constraints,

governmental

stable

monetary

a

framework intended to foster and enforce liberal trade policies3. The original
commitment to free trade,manifested in the "General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade" (GATT)4, was cautious and tentative, but it did require that
participating nations avoid discriminatory tariffsand the use of non-tariff
barriers5. The members of GATT
also agreed to periodic discussions on
in trade barriers6.

reductions

Private restraints of trade, however, have been left to national and, in the
notable example of theEuropean Community (herafter:EC)7, multinational
The

regulation.
quences
nations

of

international

restrictive

to limit

such

has

community

trade

recognized

the adverse

conse

and

practices8.

among
practices,
encouraged
cooperation
an
to enforce
No
institution
exists, however,

internationally accepted code of conduct.

1981: L. Pol.
International

Int. Bus.
Antitrust

14 (1982) 1-46 (cited: Antitrust Improvements Act); R. Geiger,
and Related Trade
Issues, in: The United
States, Transnational

and the Law
1-21; H. Gray, International Trade,
Investment, and Payments
Business,
(1979); H. Kronstein, The Law of International Cartels (1973) [English text of id.,Das Recht
der internationalen Kartelle
(1967)]; A. Lowenfeld, Public Controls on International Trade2

Law, VI); J. Rahl, International Cartels and Their Regula
(1983) (International Economic
in International Business,
ed. by O. Schachter/R. Hellawell
tion, in: Competition
(1981)
240-276; W. Reinsch, The Export Trading Company Act of 1981: L. Pol. Int. Bus. 14(1982)
and Investment4 (1970); J. Spero, The Politics of
47-127; F. Root, International Trade

International Economic
Relations2
(1981).
1
Lowenfeld ?2.1.
2 Root 362
f.; Spero 23 f.
3
Lowenfeld ?2.2.
4
for Signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Opened
No.
als
A3, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S.
187; see generally, E. Petersmann, Protektionismus
und Rechtsproblem:
RabelsZ
47 (1983) 478-507.
Ordnungsproblem
5
Lowenfeld ?2.3.
6
Lowenfeld ?2.3.
7 Arts. 85 and 86 EEC
Treaty.
8
on Trade and Development]
"Restrictive Business Practi
[United Nations Conference
ces inRelation to theTrade and Development
of Developing
Countries", UNCTAD-Doc.
1 (1974),

TD/B/C.2/119/Rev.
Booklet

repr. in: Anti-Trust

and Restrictive

Business

6, pp. 370-378.
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The economic regime established afterWorld War IIworked remarkably
well for several decades, at least for the industrialized nations of theWest and
The

Japan.

recoveries

economic
and

extraordinary,

of war-ravaged

economies

throughout

Germany
were
the West

and

were
Japan
Recent

robust.

years, however, have brought significant changes. For one thing, thenations
of the Third World have become increasingly critical of the system that
frequently, they believe, frustrated their developmental goals9. The most
dramatic

contemporary

however,

changes,

have

been

the result

of develop

ments in the economies of themajor industrialized nations. The post-War
system was built upon the dominant position of theUnited States and its
The

currency10.

international

economy

of the non-Socialist

World

has,

how

ever, become tri-polar now that theEC (led economically by Germany) and
Japan aremajor participants in the internationalmarketplace11. In light of this
new

reality,

American

economic

leadership

became

an

unacceptable

burden

to theUnited States and itsmajor trading partners12.The regime established
after theWar has been abandoned and theWestern World is searching for a
new

order.

These new economic realities have probably brought the developed
nations of theWest and Japan to themost critical point in post-World War II
history. Although theUnited States remains politically andmilitarily domi
nant in theWest, Americans must adjust economically, politically and
psychologically to a diminished economic role while Japan and Europe
assume more of the responsibilities of leadership. The ultimate challenge of
this decade may be the creation of an international framework that can

support healthy commercial rivalrywhile maintaining vital economic and
political unity; thegreatest threat is that themajor economic powers will turn
to protectionist policies which in the past led to downward economic spirals
which left theworld poorer and politically and militarily unstable13. The
dangers should not be exaggerated, butmust be recognized ifnational policy
makers

are to rise above

parochial

interests.

This article deals with a narrow aspect of thebroader issuewhich has been
outlined. It explores the extraterritorial application of theUnited States'
antitrust

laws

as an instrument

of progressive

international

economic

policy.

American legal scholarship on extraterritorial application normally focuses
on the rules periodically announced by federal courts indetermining whether
theymay or should exercise jurisdiction in cases involving foreign nationals
or conduct occurring outside of theUnited States14.The literature traces the
9 Root 431-438.
10
Spero 26 f.
11
Spero 27 f.
12
Spero 28.
13
5j?ero 25.
14E.
g., Atwood/Brewster

I ??6.01-6.11;

Fw^die eh. 2.
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developments from the rigid territorial approach announced by Justice
in the American Banana decision15, through the expansive effects
Holmes
standard generally attributed to theAlcoa decision16, to the currentlypopular
comity, or balancing of interests, analysis originally developed by theNinth
Circuit Court ofAppeals in theTimberlane case17.This article concentrates on
the implications of several contemporary legislative enactments as reflections
of a policy ofwithdrawal from theAmerican commitment to foster liberal
international trade policies through the extraterritorial application of its
antitrust

laws.

Initially, two points should be clarified. First, the term "antitrust law" is
used

here

in a very

broad

sense

encompassing

the fundamental

American

commitment to an economy that isorganized by private choices made within
the framework of competitive markets. This commitment is primarily
embodied in the provisions of secs. 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act18 and sec. 7 of
theClayton Act19. Secondly, this articlewill not attempt to identify the outer
15American Banana Co. v. United Fruit
347 (1909).
Co., 213 U.S.
16United States v. Aluminum Co.
ofAmerica, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
17Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank
ofAmerica, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
18Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C.
? 1, states:
in the form of trust or otherwise,
or
Every contract, combination

in
conspiracy,
is
among the several States, or with foreign nations,
to be illegal. Every person who
shall make
declared
any contract or engage in any
or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed
combination
guilty of a
restraint of trade or commerce

felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million
dollars if a corporation,
or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by
three years, or by both said punishments,
in the discretion
imprisonment not exceeding
of the court.
Section

2, 15U.S.C.

?2, provides:
or attempt to
or combine or
shall monopolize,
person who
monopolize,
to monopolize
any part of the trade or
conspire with any other person or persons,
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a
therof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million
felony, and, on conviction
dollars if a corporation,
or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by
in the discretion
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments,
of the court.
19Section 7 of the
? 18, provides in relevant part:
Clayton Act, 15U.S.C.
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce
shall acquire,
directly, or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no
Every

shall acquire the
person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission
whole or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in commerce or in any
activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantial
ly to lessen competition, or to tend to create amonopoly.
No person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or
other share capital and no person subject to thejurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commis
sion shall acquire thewhole or any part of the assets of one or more persons engaged in
or in any activity
affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or in
any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisi
commerce
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limitsof the extraterritorial reach of national laws under international law and
No

convention.

clear

line

can

It is assumed,

drawn.

be

however,

that

the

United Statesmay impose its antitrustpolicies on domestic firms engaging in
enterprise activities within American territoryirrespective of the location of
any

adverse

of those

consequences

activities.

So,

the United

States

may,

for

example, outlaw a domestic conspiracy tofix theprices of goods sold abroad.
The article also assumes generally that foreign activities having at least a
direct, substantial and foreseeable adverse effect on the commerce of the
United Statesmay be prohibited.

II. Economic

Background

Economic theories regarding the benefits and drawbacks of free interna
tional trade are complex and cannot be fully developed here. The same
applies in regard to the significantnon-economic values fostered by interna
tional freemarkets and by restrictive trade policies. The following sections,
though, present a brief synopsis of the rationale underlying theWestern
basic commitment to liberal trade policies, and the principal
World's
counter-arguments

1.

Western

somewhat

favoring

International

economists

attach

restricted

Free Market

significant

markets.

Perspectives

positive

value

to

inter

competitive

national markets. Important economic, political and social goals will be
fostered by freely operating markets, unconstrained by either government
action or private monopoly. A freemarket regime, one open to the freeflow
of goods and production factors such as capital and technology, will predic
tably

the efficient

promote

allocation

of scarce

international

resources20.

The

wealth of the international community will increase as businesses, disciplined
by the constant pressure of competition, bring together thevarious factors of
production in efficient combinations21. Each nation will capture the benefits
of its comparative

advantages

in the international

marketplace22.

The

capital,

technology and know-how of developed industrial nations, for example,
may combine with the human and abundant natural resources of less
developed nations to produce lower- priced finished goods. Consumers will
tion, of such stocks or assets , or of the use of such stock by the voting or granting of
or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a

proxies

monopoly.
20
Garvey, Transnational
21Root 86-91.
22 See
Gray 16-25.

Joint Ventures

352-354.
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served as the output of desired products increases and

predictably be well
prices
An

e. garvey

decrease.
international

transactions

economic
also

would

to unrestrained

committed

regime

have

macroeconomic

tangible

private
Indus

consequences.

try organized along international lines, efficiently exploiting the available
resources of developing lands, will directly increase the productivity and
wealth of thehost nations. More importantly, theywill bring skills, know
how, and sometimes technology that can be transferred to other productive
enterprises. Such nations, therefore, develop over time the capacity for
independent

and more

based

broadly

economic

expansion23.

Political and social benefits will also be likely to flow from the economic
growth stimulated by an international competitive regime. History has
demonstrated

that

concentrated

privately

political interventionwhich
for example,

regulation which Congress

abuses

were

of the "trusts"

more

to prevent

in part

intended

restrained

and

industry

can

invite

is potentially untoward; the Sherman Act was,
forms

direct

of government

fearedmight result if the perceived monopolistic

not

otherwise

curbed24.

Private

cartels

facilitated

the total control of German industry as theNational Socialist Regime con
solidated itspower25. The expansion ofwealth in developing nations (assum
ing the benefits of economic expansion are reasonably distributed) might be
expected to promote social and political stability, as a substantialmiddle class
often seems to be a principal prerequisite for stable democratic government.

2. The Theory of the Second-Best
There aremany realworld constraints thatmake the theoretical ideal of an
international
transaction

free market
costs

exist

unattainable.

Market
as well

in international,

failure,

as national

externalities
markets26.

They

and
are

to be
in international
transactions27.
International
likely
exaggerated
face national
for example,
traders,
monopolies,
transportation
heightened
not found
and numerous
costs,
barriers,
legal restrictions
language
generally
in fact

in national
National

markets.
restrictions

are

for

imposed

a

variety

of

reasons.

Developed

countries, including theUnited States, have restricted the free flow of goods,
technology and capital. Some restrictions have been justified by legitimate
security concerns28, since national defense, for example, might be prejudiced
23
Gray 379 f.
24H.
Thorelli, The
25Rahl 245.
26?oo? 61-74.

Federal Antitrust

27
Garvey, Transnational
28Root 1S5(.

Policy

Joint Ventures

(1954) 226 f.

354?357.
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if confidential military equipment and know-how could readily pass to
hostile nations. The preservation of jobs is themost likely significantpolitical
motivation for protective policies. Economic theory suggests, however, that
such policies are not likely to serve national interests, and certainlywill ill
serve

the international

community29.

Nevertheless,

an

analysis

of trade policy

that failed to appreciate the political influence of the labor force, or the social
upheaval likely to accompany the loss of significantnumbers of jobs would
be seriously flawed.
The

reasons

for various

restrictions

of

international

commerce

and

the

diverse nature of such legal and extra-legal constraints, only some of which
have been identified above, provide an economic rationale for national

a rationale
with
free market
forces,
encompassed
or
In essence,
of
the
the theory assumes
second-best30.
theory
by
not
first-best
international
markets
is
free
that
the
option
recognizes
reason.
The
best policy,
real
for whatever
therefore, must
accept
possible,
on trade as are necessary
to
such
restraints
and
world
limitations
impose
responses

which

interfere

the so-called

achieve the optimal performance possible under the circumstances.
The economic theory of the second-best assumes that second-best policies
will foster themost efficientpossible allocation of international resources. In
the hands

of national

policy-makers,

however,

the concept

may

assume

a less

international orientation.Market distortions imposed by one nation are often
likely to provoke protective or retaliatory responses that are unlikely to
enhance thewealth of the international community.

3. Developmental

Perspective

As briefly outlined (supra, 1), certain economic theories suppose that
national economic growth and development will occur when previously
scarce factors of production (such asmanagement skills and technology) pass
to nations hosting foreign enterprises. Many less-developed nations, how
ever, believe that the liberal trade and investment policies established by
industrialized nations substantially affect theirdomestic economies by limit
ing their ability to control development and denying them a fair share of the
supposedly driven by market forces has
generated wealth31. Development
often failed to satisfynational economic, social and political needs. The view,
given theoretical supportwithin the theory of the second-best (supra, 2), that
free internationalmarkets are in fact not possible, makes this conclusion less
surprising. Imbalances of financial, technological and bargaining power and
29
Gray 166-168.
30 See Root 161 f.
31
Spero 27; Gray 287 f.
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resources between trading partners in developed and less developed states
respectively would be relevant elements in the specific application of the
theory of the second-best in this context. The frustration of the desire, for
example, for an independent, locally-controlled and diverse economy by an
international market interested solely in exploiting an abundant resource
such as unskilled labor can then be regarded as an expected outcome. In
response

to such

concerns,

many

nations

have

on

restrictions

imposed

trade

in goods and investment in order to foster domestic developmental goals32.
Restrictive national policies intended to promote development are fre
quently intended to protect infant industries33,to insure local participation in
to foster

and

management34,

the transfer

of valuable

and know

technology

how35.Many developing countries apparently have littlefaith in the ability of
markets alone to deliver the resources they need for independent economic
vitality. Moreover,
countries.
Canada,
can

would

corporations

foreign

firms

some

are not limited
concerns
to less
developed
to a fear that Ameri
in response
presumably
its economy,
restricts
dominate
investments
by
businesses36.
of these

for example,

in Canadian

In spite of demands that free market forces be moderated to achieve
national developmental objectives, the developing nations of theWest
remain essentially committed to liberal trade and investment policies37. They
wish to purchase goods in competitive markets and to sell their natural
resources

and products

to non-cartelized

buyers38.

In any

case,

foreign

capital

and skills are essential to the growth of less developed economies. Therefore,
the arguments favoring restrictivepolicies to foster development can justify
only

limited

governmental

restraint.

32
Garvey, Transnational
Joint Ventures 354 f.; see Gray ch. 13.
33
Gray 162-166.
34R.
Transfer and Joint Ventures
in Latin American
Radway, Antitrust, Technology
15 (1983/84) 47-70
characterizes
the
(64). Gray (382-391)
Lawyer Am.
Development:
problem as a perceived loss of sovereignty.
35 "Restrictive Business Practices ..."
(supra n. 8) p. 374 f.; Radway (supra n. 34) 51-75.
36 Investment Canada Act
(S.C. 1985, c. 20), replacing the Foreign Investment Review
Act (S.C. 1973-74, c. 46); see 5. Le Gou?ff, Loi sur Investissement Canada,
Le contr?le des
au Canada
64 (1986) 703-720; Was
the Sigh of
[L?gislation]: Can.Bar.Rev.
Investment Canada
The
Act
19 (1986)
Premature?,
[Note]: Vand.J.Transn.L.
613-650. On October
4, 1987, theUnited States and Canada
agreed in principle to establish
Pact to Cut Trade Rules:
free trade between the two nations; see S. Auerbach, U.S.-Canada
investissements

Relief

The Washinghton
Post, October
5, 1987, p. 1. col. 6. As to the former Canadian Act of 1973
see T. Hadden/R. Forbes/R. Simmonds, Canadian Business Organization
Law (1984) 79-82.
37
"Report of the Third Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices on Its
TD/B/C.
l/AC.6/20
Sixth Session", UNCTAD-Doc.
and
(1979), repr. in: Anti-Trust
Restrictive Business Practices I. Booklet 6, p. 134.
38
to Restrictive Business Practices",
and Rules and Other
Issues Relating
"Principles
UNCTAD-Doc.
and Restrictive Business Practices I.
(1979), repr. in:Anti-Trust
(TC/231)
Booklet

6, p. 59 f.
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Policy

Cartels have been defined as "voluntary agreements among independent
enterprises in a single industry or closely related industrieswith the purpose
of exercising

a

of

control

monopolistic

the market"39.

cartels

International

pursue the same goals but their actions can have implications formore
one

than

nation.
often

governments
Although
national
economic
achieve

tolerate40,

goals41,

and

the theoretical

sometimes
and

foster

cartels

case

historical

to

against

unregulated private cartels is overwhelming. Driven solely by the desire for
industrialized
profits, they distort and restrict international trade. Most
nations, therefore,will not tolerate such activities ifthey affect theirmarkets42
and the developing world considers private cartels to be inimical to their
economic

goals43.

In the absence of an internationally accepted and enforceable prohibition
against cartels, the extraterritorial application of national competition laws
must play a key role in thebattle against privatelymonopolized international
taken to avoid anticompetitive domestic effects by the
trade. Measures
world's major trading nations have prevented the re-creation of the cartels
that dominated much international commerce between the two World
Wars44.

Most

nations

have

been

unconcerned,

about

however,

domestic

cartels which direct their activities towards foreign consumers and com
petitors.
economic

True
power,

The

tolerance

of

such

cartels

represents,

I believe,

a

short-sighted

policy.

international cartels, those achieving and exercising monopoly
have

undesirable

political

and

economic

consequences45.

Competing

producers, including those within domestic markets, must necessarily dis
cuss and reach agreements regarding production and prices ifa cartel is to be
effective.Although under most antitrust exemptions theirdecisions are not
legally limited when applying tomatters that affect only foreign sales and
customers, the related exchange of information and decision making pro
39 "International
40Rahl 260-263.
41Rahl 263-266.

Cartels"

(1947)

1 (United Nations

Department

of Economic

Affairs).

42Rahl 250.
43
n. 38).
..."
(supra
"Principles and Rules
44 International Cartels
n. 39).
(supra
45The term "true international cartels" is intended to
distinguish cooperative entities that
may be appropriately identified as joint ventures. These terms "cartel" and "joint venture"
law. I am, however, using the term cartel to identify
precise meaning under American
or exercise
activities intended to achieve, maintain,
i.e.,
power,
monopoly
cooperative
restrict output and raise prices; seeJ. Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy: Harv. L.
Rev. 95 (1982) 1521-1591
and Garvey, Transnational
335f.
(1524-1527),
Joint Ventures
-lack

(adopting Brodley's

definition).
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industries

characteristics
having
appropriate
domestic
Rational
business
consequences.

to have

certain

e. garvey
to cartels
people

is almost
are

simply

too aware of theirown economic interests to blind themselves to the potential
domestic benefits of their agreements. Similarly, when national cartels join
with foreign producers, the temptation to respect each other's home markets
will be great.
In the international marketplace, cartels impair economic growth and
unfairly exploit the consumers and producers of vulnerable nations.
Developing countries will be unlikely to enjoy the benefits of freermarkets
when they face cartels tolerated by the nations that could most effectively
control

them46.

to an

contribute

therefore,

Cartels,

international

environ

ment that limits growth, generates hostility, and prompts disadvantageous
counter-measures

and

that could

IV. The Role

should

be avoided.

of American

Antitrust Law

The American antitrust laws have traditionally enjoyed a special legal
status. The Sherman Act, for example, has been described by theUnited
States'

Supreme

Court

been treatedwith
Antitrust

provisions.

as

the

Carta

"Magna

of free enterprise"47

and

it has

the reverence normally accorded only to constitutional
also

fostered

goals

other

than

economic

efficiency.

Judge Hand, for example, stated in the landmark Alcoa decision that the legal
aversion tomonopoly is "based upon the belief thatgreat industrial consoli
dations

are

inherently

undesirable,

regardless

of their economic

results"48.

In

1962, the Supreme Court had adopted a similar interpretationof sec. 7 of the
Clayton Act:
desire to promote
"We cannot fail to recognize Congress'
competition
through
the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses.
that
Congress
appreciated
of fragmented
occasional
higher costs and prices might result from themaintenance
It resolved
these competing
in favor of
and markets.
considerations
industries
"49
decentralization.

Interpreted in thisway, the antitrust laws clearly represented a statement of
fundamental political, social and economic policy.
Despite this strong philosophical commitment to the principles of anti
trust, theAmerican belief in competition has experienced lapses, in domestic
aswell as in foreign applications. Some industries have been exempted from
the rule of competition although they are generally subject to some form of
46Rahl 261 f.
47United States v.
Topeo Associates, 405 U.S.
48United States v. Aluminum Co.
ojAmerica
49Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S.

596, 610 (1972).
n. 16) 428.
(supra
294, 344 (1962).
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government regulation intended to protect the public from monopolistic
the United States' commitment to
abuse. During the Great Depression
as
almost
the
had
government turned to cartels spon
collapsed
competition
sored by theNational Recovery Administration (NRA) in order to pull the
country

out

of its financial

distress50.

The international scope of the antitrust laws has also changed significantly
with time.The first several decades of antitrust enforcementwere marked by
little interest in the extraterritorial reach of the laws. In 1909, the Supreme
Court embraced a strict jurisdictional standard of territoriality that limited
the Sherman Act's prohibitions primarily to domestic activities51.This rigid
approach began to erode shortly after itwas created52,but a sweeping "effects
was

standard"

not

adopted

until

194553.

In 1894 Congress enacted theWilson Tariff Act54, making it illegal to
restrain the import commerce of theUnited States. In 1918, however, the
Legislature passed theWebb-Pomerene Act55, demonstrating that itwas less
concerned

about

export

restraints.

Export

associations

were

given

a

qualified

exemption from the application of the antitrust laws. During this same time
period, theOcean Shipping Act of 191656granted ocean carrier conferences an
antitrust exemption subject to regulatory oversight.
It isnot surprising that theUnited States' antitrust laws played a relatively
minor role in the international arena prior toWorld War II. The regulation of
international tradewas theprovince of tariffsand theUnited States was in an
America

mood57.

isolationist

came

out

ofthat War,

however,

with

its indus

trial structure intact,great faith in its economic philosophy, with the antitrust
laws at its core, and the ability and willingness to lead theWorld's non
Socialist

industrialized

nations58.

For several decades during and following theWar,
commitment

to

competition

was

renewed.

The

therefore, theAmerican
Supreme

Court,

in

the

Socony-Vacuum decision59, implicitly but emphatically abandoned the pro
cartel stance ithad adopted only a few years earlier in theAppalachian Coals
case60. It also demonstrated in theTimken decision that ithad no tolerance for
50The NRA

was created under the authority of sec. 2 of theNational
Industrial Recovery
in A. L.A.
of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
(1934), which was declared unconstitutional
?702
495 (1935).
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
51American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.
n. 15).
(supra
52
Garvey, Antitrust Improvements Act 7f.
53United States v. Aluminum Co.
ofAmerica (supra n. 16).
54Wilson Tariff
28 Stat. 570 (1894), 15 U.S.C.
Act, ch. 349, ??73-77,
??8-11.
55
??61-65.
Export Trade Act, ch. 50, 40 Stat. 516 (1918), 15U.S.C.
56
??801-842.
Shipping Act, ch. 451, 39 Stat. 728 (1916), 46 U.S.C.
57
Spero 26.
58
Spero 26 f.
59United States v.
150 (1940).
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
60
v. United States, 288 U.S.
344 (1933).
Appalachian Coals, Inc.

Act
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international cartels and that itwould not seriously consider the exigencies of
international

commerce

as

reasons,

Shipping Act,

such

justifying

the Webb-Pomerene

conduct61.

as amended

Largely

became

exemption

for economic
and

insignificant62,

the

in 196163, seriously limited the potential for

ocean
abuses
by
anticompetitive
In the post-War
environment,

conferences64.
shipping
the United
States
pursued

an

expansive

international antitrust policy on several fronts. The Allies, believing that
cartels had played amajor role in the growth of the totalitarian regimes that
led theworld towar, were willing to impose favored economic policies on
defeated lands65.The Justice Department was also determined to enforce
the antitrust

vigorously

laws

cartels66.

international

against

The

Alcoa67

deci

sion's expansive jurisdictional standard based on "effects"made aggressive
enforcement possible and the government demonstrated its resolve to dis

mantle

cartels68.

This expansive approach to antitrust enforcement had a natural impact on

consumers

and

producers

of

other

nations.The

American

was

economy

dominant in the non-Socialist World and participation in thatvital economic
market required, by and large, compliance with American competition
policy.

American

Moreover,

firms

in business

engaging

were

abroad

gener

ally unwilling to participate in local cartel activities for fear of potential
antitrust liability in theUnited States69.Competition was at times, therefore,
injected into economies thatwere domestically open to cartelization. Con
sumers in other countries received both thebenefits of enhanced competition
and the right to claim treble damages under the Clayton Act for injuries
resulting from an antitrustviolation70. Both the restrictions and rights of the
antitrust

laws were

The

extraterritorial

course,
activities

not

been

tread on

thus

applied
enforcement

to American
of United

welcomed.

universally
their sovereignty71,

foreign
States'

Some

commerce.
antitrust

nations

and American

laws

consider

and foreign

of

has,

that

such

businessmen

alike often claim they have been treated unfairly when made liable for
activities that are legal in the countries where they occurred. American
antitrust law has recognized thepartial validity of these claims and tradition
61 Timken Roller
v. United States, 341 U.S.
593 (1951).
Bearing Co.
62
Is Somebody
An Assessment
of Whether
"Wolf?,
J. Ongman,
Crying
Int. L. Bus. 1 (1979) 163-218 (193-202).
Impedes Export Trade: NW.J.
63Amendment
of 1961, Pub. L. 87-254, 75 Stat. 522 (1961).
64
Garvey, Regulatory Reform 16-19.
65Rahl 247.
66
Fugate ? 1.2; Kronstein 448 f.
67United States v. Aluminum Co.
ofAmerica (supra n. 16).
68
Fugate ?1.2.
69Rahl 248.
70
308, 313-315
Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S.
71Atwood/Brewster I
?? 4.06-4.13.

(1978).
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three related doctrines to protect the sovereignty of other

ally employed
nations

EXTRATERRITORIAL

U.S.

concerns

fairness

the

of

businesses.

private

First,

foreign sovereign immunity provides extensive protection in suits against
foreign

states

their non-commercial

for

activities72.

the act of

Second,

state

doctrine precludes American courts from rendering a judgment in a private
suitwhen the decision necessarily questions thewisdom or propriety of the
acts of a foreign sovereign73. Finally, the doctrine of foreign government
compulsion protects private partieswhich have actedwithin a foreign state in
amanner

by

that state's

States'

commerce

compelled

In combination,

government74.

these

three

doctrines drew the line - a blurry line to be sure between activities having
effects

on United

to successful

requisite

under

prosecution

American antitrust law and those that are beyond the reach ofthat law.

American

V. Changing

Perceptions

The internationalist spirit that followed World War II lasted for several
decades. Throughout this period theUnited States, through persuasion,
of its antitrust
the application
in recent years have,
factors

agreement,

and

tional

Several

trade.

parochial outlook in theUnited

laws

fostered

however,

States.

freer

produced

interna
a more

1. Foreign Competition
In the 1970s, American
foreign
competition
American
Established

producers began to face increasingly effective

in foreign

and domestic

industries,

markets

communities,

that were

and workers

result of new international competitive realities.Not

once

secure75.

suffered

as

a

surprisingly, important

72 In
Immunities Act of 1976,
States adopted the Foreign Sovereign
1976, the United
L. No.
94-583, 90 Stat. 2892 (1976), 28 U.S.C.
1332(a), 1391(f), 1441(d),
??1330,
1602-1611, which does not exempt commercial activities from suit; seeH. Strebet, Staaten
und die neuen Gesetze der Vereinigten
Staaten und
immunit?t, Die Europaratskonvention
RabelsZ
44 (1980) 66-98 (comparing European Convention
with British
Gro?britanniens:
Pub.

and American
statutes); Th. Hill,
Immunity and the Act of State Doctrine,
Sovereign
States Law: ibid. 46 (1982) 118-164.
Theory and Policy inUnited
73Underhill v.
168 U.S.
250, 252 (1897); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes
Hernandez,
Cal.
Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (CD.
1971), affirmed: 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.),
certiorari denied: 409 U.S.
950 (1972); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.),
certiorari denied: 434 U.S.
984 (1977); see Hill and Strebel 71-73
(supra n. 72); P. Hay,
International

Versus

Interstate Conflicts

429-495
(478-485).
74
Atwood/Brewster I ?? 8.14-8.23.
75
Garvey, Antitrust Improvements

Law

in the United

States: RabelsZ

Act 3.
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American political constituencies have sought protection, often claiming
theywere victims of unfair competitive practices. The political pressure to
interferewith freely operating internationalmarkets became extreme as the
United States experienced extraordinary trade imbalances over the past
several

In fact,

years76.

history77.

the United
economic

Moreover,

States
predictions

is now

the greatest
nation-debtor
that a weaker
dollar would

in
solve

the problem of trade deficits have proven to be false; and, similarly, experi

ence

national

The

as some
had
cannot,
producers
expected,
for high-technology
In
America's
inter
short,
products78.
are acute and the solutions
are evasive.
problems

shown

has

dominate

that American

markets
economic

search for ready answers to complex problems involving American
and

competitiveness

trade

flows

has

often

focused

on

antitrust79.

Some

in the

business community have claimed that the antitrust laws have impaired their
ability to enter into efficient combinations needed to penetrate foreignmar
kets80.Neither legal analysis nor factual evidence support such claims, but
theyhave credibility in the halls of Congress81. In this environment, it is not
surprising thatAmerican policy-makers and legislators have largely aban
doned a sweeping vision of international growth and development through
freemarkets, as well as the resolve to extend the benefits and restrictions of
the antitrust laws to foreign producers and consumers. The United States'
commitment

to

competition

has

sagged.

2. The Influence of the "Chicago School"
econo
The successful assault by the "Chicago School" ofNeo-Classical
mists on substantive antitrust law has also had substantial impact on the
perceived nature of the laws and their appropriate goals82. In the process of
76The United

States' current account deficit reached a record of 140.57 billion Dollars

in

18, 1987, p. 1, col. 1.
1986; International Herald Tribune, March
77 International Herald Tribune
loc. cit. (supra n. 76).
78 5.
Role forU.S.:
International Herald Tribune, April 17,
Auerbach, A New Economic
1987, p. 1, col. 2.
79
Garvey, Antitrust Improvements Act 3f.
80ReinschbS?.
81
n. 62) 216 f.
Ongman (supra
82The
term "Chicago
It is a body of policies
lacks precise meaning.
School"
and
over several
theoreticans at theUniversity
of Chicago
assumptions developed by economic
to antitrust law originally adopted by certain legal
decades and reflected in the approach

of both the general economic premises and of the
scholars at that university. Advocates
States,
throughout the United
specifically legal aspects of them are found at universities
among the judiciary, and in key government
positions with responsibility for antitrust
it can be stated that the legal adherents of
enforcement. At some risk of oversimplification
the "Chicago School"
activities (agreements

believe

between

that antitrust should properly be concerned with classic cartel
competitors to limit output and raise prices) and horizontal
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flaws,

of reform

proponents

stripped the antitrust laws of the special legal status achieved when the federal
courts viewed them as a "charter of freedom"83 that embodied goals other
than economic efficiency (see supra, IV).
school analysts focus solely on the efficiency implications of
Chicago

business

is, on

that

activities,

to increase

their ability

or

output

lower

costs.

Their economic model does not account for the political or social benefits
believed to be derived from a less productively efficient industrial order, nor
does it recognize that innovation prompted by competition among numer
ous independent businesses may ultimately produce a more efficient order
than one committed to the immediate efficiencies of a concentrated and
restrained

Their

industry.

to the antitrust

approach

laws

has,

however,

won

widespread support. Even the Supreme Court has decided that the political
and social content of the antitrust laws is too amorphous to significantly
antitrust

influence

has

Antitrust

jurisprudence84.

been

to an

reduced

instru

ment of economic efficiency and, under the prevailing economic view, ithas
failed badly in this purpose. Not surprisingly, ithas now become respectable
to challenge vigorously the basic antitrust laws85.
now

The

economic

dominant

to antitrust

approach

policy

also measures

economic performance by its ability to satisfy consumer demands. The
of competitive

impact

on business

conduct

rivals, workers

and

communities

is, therefore, generally irrelevant tomodern antitrust analysis. Judge Bork,
for

Court

the

on

emphasis

antitrust

characterized

example,
tion"86 and

Supreme
consumer
satisfaction

law

has

as

a "consumer

adopted

has

impact

that
on

welfare

characterization87.

the United

prescrip
This

States'

resolve

to apply its antitrust laws extraterritorially, at least to the extent that they

grant

the protection

of American

law

to

foreigners.

Earlier formulations of antitrustpolicy had placed greater emphasis on the

value

of

the

processes

of

competition.

Neither

market

structures

nor

that achieve very high levels of industrial concentration. Other restraints thatmay
be subject to antitrust scrutiny are, the Chicagoans
believe, generally either
or subject tomarket-generated
discipline. Classic works of the "Chi
efficiency-enhancing
include R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox
(1978); R. Postier, Economic Analysis
cago School"

mergers

traditionally

of Law2 (1977).
83
v. United
Appalachian Coals, Inc.
84 See Continental T.
V., Inc. v. GTE
85
the antitrust laws have
Although
is the first to endorse
Administration
limit antitrust enforcement; see, in a

States (supra n.. 60) 359.
Inc., 433 U.S.
Syhania,

36, 53 n. 21 (1977).
through periods of lax enforcement, the current
thatwould
significantly alter and
legislative proposals
gone

on International Trade
paper read at the Conference
Nov.
and Antitrust Laws, Nihon University,
6, 1986, W. Grimes, Economic
Tokyo,
Hikakuh?
[Nihon U.
Theory and a Century of American Antitrust Policy: Nihon-Daigaku

L. Rev. (Journal)] 3 (1986) 71-90 (75).
Comp.
86Bork
n. 82) 66.
(supra
87Reiterv. Sonotone
330, 343 (1979).
Corp., 442 U.S.
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behavior should be allowed to impair the processes of competition. An
environment that supports competition stimulates innovation and efficient
marketing and production techniques. The intangible, and immeasurable
benefits of constant competitive tension are valued more highly than the
observable

efficiency gains that sometimes accompany
The

competition88.

difference

between

the consumer

the elimination of

welfare

and

approach

the competitive processes approach is largely a matter of emphasis. The
competitive processes approach ismore concerned with structure and less
sensitive to specific efficiency claims, but both are ultimately intended to
foster efficiency and, naturally, to benefit consumers. The competitive pro
cesses

however,
approach,
antitrust
of
the
aspirations
The

on

emphasis

better

accommodates

the

and

political

social

laws.

consumers,

as

to the assumed

opposed

of com

benefits

petition itself, togetherwith the rejection of political or social purposes for
antitrust laws, reduces the will to impose the laws' restraints in certain
removes
It perhaps
The
States
United
applications.

contexts.

international
extraterritorial

the
has

justification
a clear interest

for

certain

in promot

ing the benefits of an international competitive order. Expanded interna
tionalwealth, more stable political and economic regimes, and the efficiency
born of sharp competition, all benefit the United States and its citizens.
Politically, it isdifficult,however, tojustify the extraterritorial application of
American law solely to protect foreign consumers, particularly when the
direct and immediate effectmay be to deny United States' producers the
potential profits ofmonopoly.

3. Foreign Hostility
Various

foreign

governments

have

taken

measures

in

recent

years

to

thwart the successful prosecution of private antitrust suits against their
nationals. Foreign hostility is, by and large, directed at American discovery
procedures and the penal aspects of a multiple damages award in private
suits89.

Legislative

efforts

abroad,

therefore,

have

been

intended

to "block"

discovery and execution of a treble damage judgment90, or to provide for the
88 See E.
L. Rev. 66
of Antitrust, A New Equilibrium:
Cornell
Fox, Modernization
(1980/81) 1140-1192
(1142f); United States v. Aluminum Co. ofAmerica (supra n. 16) 427; see
und wirtschaftspolitische
des Kartell
also E. Hoppmann, Volkswirtschaftliche
Bedeutung
und Systemfunk
in: E. Hoppmann /E. -f.Mestm?cker, Normenzwecke
und Monopolrechts,
tionen

im Recht

der Wettbewerbsbeschr?nkungen

(1974)

5-19

(Walter Eucken

Institut,

Vortr?ge und Aufs?tze, 50).
89
Atwood/Brewster I ?? 4.09 f.
90
See, e.g., Foreign Proceedings
(Excess of Jurisdiction) Act 1984 (Cwth.)
(No. 3 of
Interests Act 1980 (c. 11) (United Kingdom);
of Trading
1984) (Australia); Protection
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recapture, in domestic courts, of all or part of treble damage judgments
in the United

executed

States

by

so-called

statutes91.

"clawback"

significant antitrustproceedings in recent years have prompted some
and
well publicized anti-antitrust rhetoric from America's trading
strong
Two

partners:

In theNorth Atlantic Conference cases of the late 1970s, a federal grand jury
indicted several domestic and foreign shipping lines engaged in cartel
activities in theNorth Atlantic trades92.Ocean Shipping cartels, known as
"conferences", have enjoyed a qualified antitrust exemption since 1916 (see
infra,VI4). However, for immunity to attach, the specific conduct had to be
identified in an agreement filedwith, and approved by, theFederal Maritime
Commission
(FMC)93. The North Atlantic linerfirmswere alleged to have
fixed rates, pursuant to agreements never filed with the FMC, and to have
otherwise secretly agreed to engage in conduct thatviolated specific prohibi
tions of the Shipping Act. Despite the egregious nature of the alleged viola
tions, the linerfirms expressed dismay when theywere prosecuted, and the
governments of the foreign carriers objected strenuously to the imposition of
antitrust

penalties

on

their national

lines94.

The second case was theLaker case in the 1980s. The civil suit commenced
by Sir Freddie Laker against several American and European airlines alleging
they had destroyed Laker's discount transatlantic airline prompted an occa
sionally sharp exchange between English and American courts. British judi
cial and executive orders were issued compelling Laker and others to refrain
from prosecuting the American suit and from complying with discovery
demands95. For its part, theAmerican court with jurisdiction over the case
refused to honor the anti-suit injunction and ordered the parties to stop
with the litigation96.The
furtherefforts to have foreign jurisdictions interfere
House of Lords eventually held that theBritish carrierswere subject to the
American antitrust laws for conduct within the territorialjudisdiction of the
United States and thatonly an American court could determine themerits of
the claim97.

Act (S.C.
and for a general
1985, c. 49) (Canada);
Foreign Extraterritorial Measures
discussion of various "blocking statutes", see Atwood/Brewster I ? 4.17.
91
(Excess of Jurisdiction) Act 1984 (Cwth.) and
E.g., Australia's
Foreign Proceedings
Act (supra n. 90).
the Canadian
Foreign Extraterritorial Measures
92United States v. Atlantic Container
79-00271
filed June 1,
Line, Crim. No.
(D.D.C.,
1979).
93United States v. American Union
Transport, 327 U.S.
94
Atwood/Brewster I ?3.26.
95 "House
of Lords Frees Laker to Proceed with U.S.

437, 445-447
Antitrust

and Trade Reg. Rep. 47 (1984) 175-176.
96Laker
Airways Limited v. Pan American World Airways,
1983).
97British
Airways

v. Laker Airways,

[1985] A.C.

Suit"

(1946).
[Article]: Antitrust

559 F. Supp.

85.
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Both theLaker and theNorth Atlantic Conference cases involved industries
that are international in scope and nature, and which possess the unique
characteristics

economic
such

industries

have

of

created

common

transportation

sanctioned

government

carriers.
cartels

Historically,
to estab
in order

lish rates and conditions of service98.The adverse reactions of the parties to
potential antitrust liability, therefore, aswell as theirgovernments, is some
what understandable. Their outcry, however, fed the perception in the
United States that theAmerican commitment to competition is generally not
beyond itsborders.

welcome

VI. Modern

Legislative

Developments

The factors identified above - the search for simple solutions toAmerica's
sagging international competitiveness; the perception that theUnited States'
antitrust policy iswidely resented abroad; and the ascendency of a narrow,
purely

economic,

consumer-oriented

model

-

laid

the

foundation

for

a

notable legislativewithdrawal from the expansive concept of antitrust law as
an instrument

of international

economic

development.

Legislative

proposals

to adjust the international scope of the antitrust laws demanded increased
congressional attention at the beginning of the current decade99. In 1982, this
effort came to fruition with the enactment of three laws: the Foreign
Sovereign

Antitrust

Recoveries

Act100,

the Foreign

Trade

Antitrust

Improve

ments Act101, and theExport Trading Company Act102. In 1984 Congress also
enacted the Shipping Act103, and it continues to consider other proposals to
adjust the international reach of the antitrust laws.

98 See B.
(1962) 246-252; W. Koffler,
Cheng, The Law of International Air Transport
Legal Structure, A Critical Review: J. Air L. Com. 32 (1966) 222-235; R. Agman,
and United
L. Com.
States Shipping Policy: J. Mark.
8
Rationalization,
Competition,
IATA-Its

(1976/77)1-50 (9-29).
99

See, e.g., Export Trading Company
Trade Antitrust Improvements

Foreign

(1981); Reinsch 47.
100Act of Dec.
29, 1982, Pub. L. No.

Act of 1981, S. 734, 97th Cong.,
IstSess.
(1981);
of 1981, H.R.
1st Sess.
5235, 97th Cong.,

Act

97-393,

96 Stat. 1964 (1982), codified at 15U.S.C.

? 15(b).

101
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, Title IV, 96
= Int.
Stat. 1233 (1982), codified at 15 U.S.C.
??6a, 45(a)
Leg. Mat. 22 (1983) 363 (370).
102
L.
No. 97-290, Titles I and III, 96 Stat.
Act
Pub.
of
1982,
Export Trading Company
= Int
codified at 15U.S.C.
1233(1982),
??4011-4021
Leg. Mat.
(supra n. 101) 363 and 367.
103
L.
of
Act
Pub.
No.
98-237, 98 Stat. 67 (1984), codified at 46 U.S.C.
1984,
Shipping
??1709-1719.
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1. Foreign Sovereign Antitrust Recoveries Act of 1982
The Foreign Sovereign Antitrust Recoveries Act of 1982ll)4was a direct
response to the Supreme Court's decision of 1978 inPfizer v. Government of
In Pfizer,

India105.

the Court

held

that

are

governments

foreign

"persons"

within the definition of sec. 4 of the Clayton Act. As persons, they are
entitled to sue and recover treble damages for injuries sufferedby reason of a
violation of the antitrust laws. The fact that they are foreign, and sovereign
states, does not, theCourt held, justify a different conclusion.
The Supreme Court identified several reasons for its decision in Pfizer.
Suits by foreign entities, private or sovereign, foster the enforcement goal of
the private antitrust remedy; they "deter violators and deprive them of'the
fruits

of

consumers
American
indirect
are, of course,
illegality'"106.
The Court
of such enforcement
activities.
that
noted,
however,

their

beneficiaries

the compensatory purpose of the law attaches to foreign aswell as domestic
victims107.Finally, themajority opinion relied on thegeneral rule thatforeign
nations

as a matter

to the same
of comity,
entitled
and individuals108.
corporations

are,

are domestic

access

to civil

courts

as

Senator Strom Thurmond, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
has identified two aspects of thePfizer decision that prompted a legislative
First,

response109.

treble

damages

were

for

available

foreign

governments

while the government of theUnited States was under statutory law entitled
only to actual damages110; and, second, nations that did not provide the
United States with a remedy for similar acts were granted a right of action
despite the lack of reciprocity.
As

Congress

considered

various

so-called

"Pfizer

bills",

proposed

reci

procity requirements became themajor point of contention. In theNinety
Seventh Congress, the Senate passed a bill with a reciprocity provision111.
The

House

of Representatives,

however,

would

not

agree

to enact

a law with

that requirement. The House Judiciary Committee determined that a reci
procity requirement would be an extraordinary international provision and
extremely difficult to administer112.The House prevailed in thisdispute. The
,04
n. 100.
Supra
105
Pfizer Inc. v. Government
106
Pfizer Inc. v. Government
107
Pfizer Inc. v. Government
108
Pfizer Inc. v. Government
109"Senate Passes
Legislation

of India (supra n.
of India (supra n.
of India (supra n.
of India (supra n.

70).
70) 314.
70) 315.

70) 318 f.
Right to Recover Damages"
Restricting Foreign Nations'
to A-5.
No.
and
1981
A-4
Antitrust
Trade
1023,
pp.
[Article]:
Reg. Rep.
110Section 4A of the
? 15a, provides the United
Clayton Act (supra n. 19), 15 U.S.C.
for injuries suffered by reason of an antitrust
States' government with actual damages

violation.
1,1 "Senate Passes
. . ."
Legislation
(supra n. 109).
112See House Committee
on the Judiciary, "Report

on the Foreign

Sovereign
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law as enacted limits the recovery of foreign sovereigns to actual damages,
but does not require the injured state to provide theUnited States govern
ment with a similar right of recovery. If,however, a foreign government is
acting in a commercial capacity thatwould deny it immunity under the
United States' Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, it is under thenew law still
(as under Pfizer) entitled to sue for trebledamages113.
Although theAct's withdrawal of the protection of the antitrust laws is
limited, the impactmay be substantial in certain contexts. The law's apparent
presumption that foreign sovereigns are, like the federal government of the
United States, in a better position than private parties to detect and prosecute
anitrust violations, or to take other selfhelpmeasures, is only partially true.
The governments of developing nations, which may assume significant

responsibility for the purchase of goods essential for thewelfare of their
citizens, such as the antibiotics at issue in the Pfizer case, may lack the
resources to police agreements for violations of theUnited States' antitrust
in the face

law. Moreover,

of an

international

cartel

substantial

controlling

flows of an essential good, some governments may lack thewill or power to
protect

themselves

be more

vulnerable

from monopolistic

In short,

abuse114.

although

countries

with vital, diverse economies and a legal commitment to competition, such
as the Federal Republic of Germany, are unlikely to be effected by the
limitation of theAmerican private antitrust remedy, developing nations may
to abuse.

2. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982
The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982115represents the
most comprehensive adjustment to date of the international reach ofAmeri
can

antitrust

law.

In response

to

persistent

claims

that

the antitrust

laws

are

perceived to impair efficient organizational structures for United States
export commerce, and in the face of legislative effortsto establish a complex,
bureaucratic

immunization

process

for export

trade

the Chair

associations,

man of the Judiciary Committee of theHouse of Representatives, Peter
Rodino, introduced a bill with the simple objective of clarifying the jurisdic

Recoveries
Committee

2d Sess. (1982), repr. in: "HouseJudiciary
Act", H.R. No. 97-476, 97th Cong.,
on Damage
Recoveries
Antitrust and Trade Reg.
by Foreign Nations":
Report

Rep. 42(1982)797-800.
113
n. 100).
Foreign Sovereign Antitrust Recoveries Act (supra
114See
"Report of the Second Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive
TD/B/C.2/166
ces", UNCTAD-Doc.
TD/B/600,
and Restrictive Business
7-13, repr. in: Anti-Trust
115
n. 101.
Supra

Business

and TD/B/C.2/AC.5/6

Practices

I, Booklet

Practi

(1976) paras.
6, pp. 289-291.
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tional reach of the antitrust laws116.The bill, as introduced would have
established that the antitrust laws apply only to foreign conduct having a
"direct and substantial" effect on commerce within theUnited States or
American

excluding

enacted,

ultimately

firms
the law

from
contains

participation
a more

in foreign
complex

commerce117.

As

as sec. 402

formulation,

illustrates:
Sections
commerce
unless
(1)

(other

than

import

Act

shall not apply

trade or

import

to conduct

commerce)

with

involving
foreign

trade or
nations

and reasonably
forseeable
has a direct, substantial,
effect
on trade or commerce which
is not trade or commerce with foreign nations,
or on
or
commerce with foreign nations; or
import trade
import
on export
trade or export commerce
with
of a person
foreign nations,
in such trade or commerce
in the United
States; and
engaged

such conduct
(A)
(B)

(2)

1 to 7 of the Sherman

such effect gives rise to a claim under
than this section.

the provisions

of sections

1 to 7 of this title,

other

If sections

1 to 7 of this title apply to such conduct only because of the operation
of
then sections 1 to 7 of this title shall apply to such conduct only for
(1)(B),

paragraph
injury to export business

in theUnited

States118.

Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which has been inter
preted to prohibit trade restraints thatviolate the law or spiritof the Sherman
Act119,was similarly amended120. Surprisingly, Congress did not adopt a
similar amendment to sec. 7 of the Clayton Act, which proscribes certain
joint ventures based on their probable anticompetitive effects121.
The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act essentially codified exist
ing enforcement policy122. It is consistent with themajority of relevant case
law and was seen as necessary only to eliminate doubts generated by a few
judicial decisions implying that a de-minimis effectwould be sufficient123.
This Act also represents only a partial withdrawal of the protection afforded
foreign victims of antitrust violations. Illegal activity having the proscribed
effecton domestic or import commerce remains subject to suit by all injured
116
IstSess.
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1981, H.R. 2326, 97th Cong.,
127 Cong. Ree. H 779 (daily
Rodino
and McClory,
(1981); see remarks of Representatives
ed. March 4, 1981).
117
n. 116).
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1981 (supra
118
n. 101) sec. 402.
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (supra
119See Federal Trade Commission v.
&
U.S.
Hutchinson
405
233 (1972).
Co.,
Sperry
120Federal Trade Commission
Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 717 (codified at 15U.S.C.
??41-51)
sec. 5 as amended by the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (supra n. 101)
sec. 403, codified at 15U.S.C.
? 45(a).
121
and Antitrust 834.
Garvey, Exports, Banking
122
Atwood/Brewster, 1986 Cumulative
Supplement ?6.21B.
123See Wells
1977);
Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir.
Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf& Western Industries, 473 F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y.
1979).
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is based

however,

solely

on

the adverse impact on American export firms, any recovery is limited to the

affected

exporters125.

Although theAct does not, in fact, significantly alterAmerican competi
tion law in so far as it relates to foreign commerce, the idea that the antitrust
laws established rights for, aswell as imposed obligations on, foreign entities
has again suffered. Foreign consumers and producers are fully subject to the
antitrust laws for conduct having the requisite impact on United States'
commerce; they are, however, entitled to the protection of theAmerican law
only when their private actions help deter violations that have a direct,
substantial

and

consumers

and producers.

reasonably

foreseeable

anti-competitive

effect

on American

3. Export Trading Company Act of 1982
Title III (sees. 307-312) of the Export Trading Company Act of 1982126
established a certification procedure, allowing the Secretary of Commerce,
with the concurrence of theAttorney General, to grant qualified immunity to
export associations. Section 303(a) of theAct provides that applicants shall be
certified to engage in export activities if such conduct will:
or restraint of trade
(1) result in neither a substantial
lessening of competition
States nor a substantial
restraint of the export
trade of any
within
the United
of the applicant,
competitor
enhance,
(2) not unreasonably
of the goods, wares, merchandise,

stabilize, or depress prices within
or services of the class
exported

theUnited

States

by the applicant,

of competition
(3) not constitute unfair methods
against competitors
engaged
or services of the class
the export of goods, wares, merchandise,
exported by
and
applicant,

in
the

to result in the sale for
be expected
any act that may
reasonably
or resale within
States
of
the
the
United
goods, wares, merchandise,
consumption
or services exported by the
applicant127.
(4) not

include

124Courts
new law have been reluctant to find the requisite adverse effect
interpreting the
on United States commerce when the immediate effects of alleged violations occur abroad,
see Eurim-Pharm GmbH v. Pfizer Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1102 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (allegations of
effects in theUnited States through an international conspiracy
"spillover" price-enhancing
to control sales of a specific antibiotic met the requisite domestic effects standard were

v. Travel impressions, Ltd., 617 F. Supp. 920 (E.D.
rejected by the court); Liamuiga Tours
N.Y.
Inc., 629 F.
(U.S.A.),
1985); Papst Motoren GmbH & Co. KG v. Kanematsu-Goshu
1986).
Supp. 864 (S.D.N.Y.
125
n. 100), codified at 15
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (supra
U.S.C.
?6a.
126
n. 102.
Supra
127
n. 102) sec. 303(a), codified at 15U.S.C.
Export Trading Company Act of 1982 (supra

? 4013(a).
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Certification protects the holder from criminal prosecution under the
antitrust

laws

and

limits

any

recovery

in civil

suits

to actual

damages128.

As with the other laws enacted in 1982 (see supra, 1 and 2), theTrading
Company Act does not represent amajor change inAmerican law; export
associations have enjoyed a qualified exemption since 1918129.It is also not
unusual for export cartels to operate free of domestic competition policies130.
The Act, however, does provide additional evidence that theUnited States is
increasingly reluctant to extend the benefits of the antitrust laws beyond its
own nationals, and, perhaps more disturbingly, it represents a significant
commitment of theUnited States to the supposed benefits of cartels.
The Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918, which has survived despite the enact
ment of theTrading Company Act, provides export associations with anti
trust immunity, provided their activities do not have certain specified anti
The government of theUnited States, however, plays
competitive effects131.
a limited role under theWebb-Pomerene
Act. Associations
seeking the
a
must
of
notice
the
the
law
file
Trade
with
Federal
Commission
protection
(FTC), which may investigatewhen ithas reason to believe that an associa
tion isnot in compliance with theAct, andmay ask theJusticeDepartment to
prosecute

activities

essentially

a neutral

it regards

as

illegal132.

The

Government,

however,

does

not encourage or approve export associations under the 1918 Act;
law-enforcer.

By

comparison,

the Export

Trading

it is

Com

pany Act places primary antitrust oversight responsibility in an agency
charged with promoting American business. The Department ofCommerce
must both promote and certify trading companies133.Not surprisingly, ithas
demonstrated an insensitivity to the benefits of antitrust policy in the past134,
and there is already evidence that this insensitivity is being reflected in the
certification
128
Export

process135.
Trading

Company

Act of 1982 (supra n. 102) sec. 306, codified at 15U.S.C.

?4016.
129
Export Trade Act (supra n. 55).
130Set Rahl 261.
131The
that evolved into Title III of the Export Trading Company
legislative proposal
Act (supra n. 102) was intended to amend theWebb-Pomerene
Act (supra n. 55). Concerns
of existing Webb-Pomerene
associations about the effects on them of the emerging legisla
resulted in enactment of an entirely new provision
that left theWebb
tion, however,
Pomerene Act intact.
132
Act (supra n. 55), 15U.S.C.
Webb-Pomerene
?65.
133Title I of the
n. 102) sec. 104, codified at
Export Trading Company Act of 1982 (supra
15U.S.C.
?4003, established an "Office of Export Trade" within the Commerce
Depart
ment. This office is to promote the creation and use of export trading companies; Reinsch
48 f.
134R.
the Secretaries of Agriculture
and Com
Folsum, Antitrust Enforcement Under
merce: Colum.
L. Rev. 80 (1980) 1623-1643
(1634).
135See Horizons
International, Inc. v. Baldridge, 624 F. Supp.
1560, 1575 (E.D. Penn.
1986), reversed, 811 F. 2d 154 (3d Cir. 1987).
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The policy judgments implicit in the determination to shift government
from a neutral enforcement role to that of an active promoter of trade
associations may prove detrimental to both domestic and international
economic

is so at least

This

aspirations.

to the extent

that

such

associations

embody the characteristics of traditional cartels, such as theNRA sponsored
associations of the 1930s136.United States' producers, for example, may be
diverted from the productive, efficiency-enhancing activities that are vital to
a domestic
sponsored

and internationally
economy.
government
competitive
Forming
will often be easier
associations
than assum
that need not compete

ing the risks and costs of innovation. Moreover, theTrading Company Act is
based largely on certain assumptions: that efficiencieswill necessarily flow
from larger size; that power achieved through internal growth or combina
tionwill be directed solely at foreign consumers and competitors; and that the
can,

government
export

intermediaries

assumptions

in

combination
better

than

with

and
exporters
organize
industry,
Each
of
market
forces137.
these
competitive

is at best suspect under both economic

experience.

Act erodes further the role that

Internationally, the Trading Company

American

antitrust

law

has

played

as an

theory and practical

instrument

of progressive

interna

tional economic policy. Rather thanpromoting the allocation of international
resources

through

the non-political

actions

of markets,

American

antitrust

policy has assumed the appearance of a protectionist measure: forcing its
competitive norms on all who do business in the United States, while
tolerating,

sometimes

even

promoting,

the impactwill be felt abroad.

anticompetitive

combinations

when

4. Shipping Act of 1984
Two years afterenacting the 1982 Acts (supra, 1-3), theCongress adopted
the Shipping Act of 1984138.This Act represents perhaps themost extraordi
nary American commitment to cartels since the Sherman Act was passed in
1890. After an extensive study of ocean-liner cartels,Congress determined in

136See
supra n. 50.
137
Garvey, Exports,
138
n. 103.
Supra

Banking

and Antitrust 821-827.
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1916 that the economics of the ocean liner industry justified the cartelized
conference

but

system,

that regulatory

was

oversight

to prevent

essential

the

abuses thathad been identified139.
In the late 1950s, both the Judiciary Committee and the Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries of theHouse of Representatives conducted
The Judiciary Committee found the
investigations of the liner industry140.
to
of
be
free
industry
essentially
regulatory oversight and to have continually
a result, sec. 15 of theAct of 1916 was
in
abusive
As
engaged
practices141.
amended in 1961142.Among
conferences

be

i. e.,

"open",

other things, the amendments required: that

that any qualified

carrier

be

to

allowed

members be free to resign without penalty; and that themembers
ferences
action143.

involved

in interconference

In combination,

these

that

of con

a
right of independent
to insure work
intended

retain

agreements

were

requirements

join;

able competition in the conference system. In addition, the 1961 amendments
provided
the public

that conference

agreements

were

to be
disapproved

if "contrary

to

interest"144.

The "public interest" standard proved to be amajor barrier to anticompeti
tive conference activities. The FMC construed the term "public interest" to

embody

the principles

required

by

of the antitrust

laws145. An

agreement

that contravened

antitrust policy, therefore, could be approved only if its proponents "bring
forth such facts as would demonstrate that [the proposed activity] was
a

serious

transportation

need,

necessary

to

secure

important

public benefits or in furtherance of a valid regulatory purpose of the Shipping
Act"146.This standard injected an element of competition unwelcome to the
ocean shipping industry147.
In the 1970s, the ocean liner industrywas battered by a general slump in
139See House

on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, "Report on Steamship
Committee
in the American
and Affiliations
Trade", H.R. Doc.
Agreements
Foreign and Domestic
No. 805, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1914) 417f. This report is popularly called the "Alexander
of theMerchant Marine
and Fisheries
(the name is derived from the Chairman
Report"
Committee, Joshua W. Alexander). For an excellent discussion of the ocean liner industry see
D. Marx,
International Shipping Cartels, A Study of Industrial Self Regulation
by Shipping
Conferences
(1953).
140
Garvey, Regulatory Reform 14.
141
on the Judiciary, "Report
of the Committee
See Staff of the Antitrust Subcommittee
on theOcean
2d Sess. (1962) 391-396.
Print, 87th Cong.,
Freight Industry", Comm.
1421961
Pub. L. No.
87-346,
?2, 75 Stat. 763 (1961),
Shipping Act Amendments,
codified at 46 U.S.C.
?814.
1431961
n. 142) ?2.
(supra
Shipping Act Amendments
1441961
n. 142) ?2.
Act
Amendments
(supra
Shipping
145
27,
Investigation ofPassenger Steamship Conferences Regarding Travel Agents, 10 F.M.C.

33-35
(1966), affirmed sub.
Amerika Linien, 390 U.S.
238
146
Investigation ofPassenger
147See
Garvey, Regulatory

nom.

Federal Maritime

Commission

(1968); Garvey, Regulatory

Reform

v.
Aktiebolaget
15 f.

Steamship Conferences Regarding Travel Agents
Reform 16-19.

(supra
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international commerce and by rapidly expanding capacity resulting largely
The disequilibrium between supply and
from the advent of container ships148.
demand prompted aggressive competition from within and without the
and

conferences,

the industry

failures149.

many

experienced

The

American

flag liner firms claimed theywere at a particular disadvantage because anti
trustpolicy was applied to themwhile their foreign competitors were not so
restricted150.

There was some belief inCongress that the liner industry suffered substan
tially from the qualified application of the antitrust laws to conference
activities151.The Shipping Act of 1984 was intended to remove all doubts,
essentially freeing the liner industry from all antitrust exposure, even for acts
that are illegal under the Shipping Act152. It also stripped the FMC of its
authority to prohibit tariff agreements containing unreasonable rates,
the agency

although

must

enforce

such

tariffs153. The

new

law,

therefore,

committed the United States more than ever before to a self-regulated,
cartelized ocean liner system. In the face of an economically distressed
domestic industry, the legislature opted for an NRA-type solution: cartels
would rationalize the industry and hopefully save less efficientUnited States
carriers.

It remains to be seenwhether thenew law will enable liner conferences to
save themselves, or theirmembers. Liner firms differ substantially in their
which makes it difficult to reach and enforce agree
levels of efficiency154,
ments affecting rates and profit-levels. The new law has also authorized the
use

of

"service

contracts"155,

i. e.,

with

agreements

specific

customers

to

provide service at non-tariff rates, which will prompt competition for the
business of large, powerful shippers.Moreover, smaller shippers have com
bined to bargain with linerfirms, and theJustice Department has indicated

148
House

on Merchant
and Fisheries,
Marine
"Report on International
1st Sess. (1983) 6 f.;
H.R. No.
53, Part 1, 98th Cong.,
Transportation",
Garvey, Regulatory Reform 20 f.
149
n. 98) 27-29; Garvey, Regulatory Reform 9 n. 65.
Agman (supra
150
on
on Maritime
Antitrust, Before the Subcommittee
Monopo
"Oversight Hearings
on the Judiciary", 97th Cong.,
2d Sess.
Law of theHouse Committee
lies and Commercial

Ocean

(1982)

Committee

Commerce

133 f. (statement of Albert E. May,

Executive

Vice

President,

Council

of American

Flag-Ship Operators).
151Senate Committee

on Commerce,
and Transportation,
Science,
"Report on the
No.
1st
7-9.
98th
Sess.
Act
of
S.
3,
1983",
(1983)
Cong.,
Shipping
152
n. 103) sec. 7, 46 U.S.C.
? 1706(a)(2).
Shipping Act of 1984 (supra
153Section
of the 1916 Shipping Act (supra n. 56), as amended in 1961 (supra
817(b)(5)
n. 142) required the FMC to disapprove
rates that are "so unreasonably high or low as to be
detrimental to the commerce of the United
States", 46 U.S.C.
? 817(b). This section was

repealedby theShippingAct of 1984 (supran. 103) ? 20(a).

154
Garvey, Regulatory Reform 21.
155
n. 103) sec. 8(c), codified at 46 U.S.C.
Shipping Act of 1984 (supra

? 1707(c).
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that it does not intend to challenge such organizations156. The fact remains,
however, that the statutory law imposes very little restraint on the carriers'
ability to organize cartels and jointly to establish the rates and conditions of
service applicable to liner service in American trades. In addition, their
agreements

Unlike

are enforced

an agency

by

of the United

States

the 1982 enactments (supra, 1-3), theOcean
for American

little regard

demonstrates

consumers.

government.

Shipping Act of 1984

The

conferences,

made

up largely of non-American carriers,may exact high rates from domestic
producers wishing to ship goods abroad, as well as from those sending
products for sale in theUnited States. The law, therefore, lacks the protec
of other
quality
commitment
disturbing
tionist

recent
to

enactments.

It does,

international

a

however,

in an

cartels

represent
area where
United

States policy once pressed for reform.

5. Recent Legislative Proposals
The

so-called

"competitiveness

issue"

a

to occupy

continues

prominent

place in theAmerican political agenda157,and the antitrust laws continue to be
viewed as partially responsible for the inability ofmany American producers
to compete effectively in internationalmarkets. Numerous legislative pro
posals have been introduced to deal with theperceived problem. Iwill discuss
only one bill that, I believe, demonstrates how seriously theAmerican belief
in the antitrust laws as instruments of domestic and foreign economic policy
has

eroded.

The Reagan Administration has recently proposed a package of legislative
reforms, the so-called Trade, Employment, and Productivity Act of 1987,
which

includes

six

to

amendments

separate

the

antitrust

laws158.

These

amendments would: first, limit the application of the antitrust laws in the case
of licenses for the use of intellectual property159; secondly, establish claim
reduction in private antitrust suits160,i. e., the reduction of thejudgment debt
by an amount proportional to thatportion of the total damage which could be
attributed to a defendant who reaches a settlementwith the plaintiffs before
156"Division Won't
to Collectively
Contracts,
Question
Shippers' Proposal
Negotiate
Antitrust and Trade Reg. Rep. 51 (1986) 96.
Rates"
[News and Comment]:
157D.
New Code Word,
Is the Undeclared
Broder, Washington's
"Competitiveness"
Issue for 1988 Race: International Herald Tribune, April 18/19, 1987, p. 1, col. 5.
158
to Revise
and Productivity Act of 1987", repr. in: "Proposals
"Trade, Employment,
from Reagan Administration's
Antitrust and Intellectual Property Laws Excerpted
'Trade,
Employment,

and Productivity

(1987)348-352.

Act of 1987"'

159
Licensing Under
"Technology
sals ..."
(supra n. 158)348.
160"Claim Reduction"
(sec. 4103),

[Article]: Antitrust

the Antitrust

Laws"

repr. in: "Proposals

and Trade

(sec. 3102),
..."

Reg.

Rep.

repr. in: "Propo

(supra n. 158) 350.
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judgment (irrespective of the actual amount of the settlement); thirdly, limit
treble damages in private actions to those suits involving overcharges or
underpayments161; fourthly, establish a jurisdictional rule of reason to be
applied in suits involving foreign commerce162;fifthly, increase the jurisdic
161"Treble
Damage

Reform"

350 f.
162See

Sec. 4121. This
1987'.
Sec. 4122.

(secs. 4112-4114),

repr. in: "Proposals

..."

(supra

Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1987
be cited as the 'Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements

part may

Section

7 of the Sherman Act

(15 U. S. C.

6a) is amended

by

n. 158)

Act of

-

(1) inserting '(a)' before 'This Act', and
(2) adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
amotion
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under this
'(b) Whenever
the court shall, except for good cause shown, hear and
section shall be made,
after such discovery or other proceedings
determine such motion,
directly related

or
appropriate, before conducting
permitting the
further
in
the
action.'
any
proceedings
parties
12 et seq.) is amended by adding after section 20
Sec. 4123. The Clayton Act (15U.S.C.
the following new section:
'Sec. 21(a) Notwithstanding
any other provision of the antitrust laws or any
to themotion

as the court deems

to conduct

provision of any State laws similar to the antitrust laws, in any action brought by any
person or State under the antitrust laws or similar State laws which involves trade or
commerce with a foreign nation, the court shall enter a judgment
the
dismissing
it determines that the exercise of jurisdiction would
action as to all parties whenever
on the basis of the following factors be unreasonable
primarily
to the violation
the
(1) the relative significance,
alleged, of conduct within
to conduct abroad;
United
States as compared
(2)
(3)

the nationality
the presence

of the persons involved in or affected by the conduct;
or absence of a purpose to affect United
States consumers

or

competitors;
(4) the relative significance and foreseeability of the effects of the conduct on the
United
States as compared with the effects abroad;
thatwould be furthered or defeated
(5) the existence of reasonable expectations
by the action; and
(6) the degree of conflict with

foreign

law or articulated

foreign

economic

policies;
Provided,
consider

That nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize the court to
the effect on the foreign political relations of the United
States of any
action sought to be dismissed.
a motion
to dismiss on the ground that the exercise of jurisdiction
(b) Whenever

would
good

this section shall be made,
the court shall, except for
such motion,
after such discovery or other
as the court deems
before
directly related to the motion
appropriate,
or permitting
in the
the parties to conduct any further proceedings

be unreasonable

cause

proceedings
conducting
action.'

shown,

under

hear and determine

Sec. 4124.

Section 12 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C.
22) ismended
by
(1) inserting '(a)' before 'That suit', and
(2) adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
in any suit, action, or
'(b) The doctrine of forum non conveniens shall be applicable
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"interlocking

directorate"

under
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of

provisions

sec. 8 of theClayton Act'63; and, sixthly, change the standards of sec. 7 of the
Clayton Act tomake mergers less problematic than under existing law164.
The nature of theAdministration's proposals demonstrates how sweeping
the challenge to the basic American antitrust laws has become. The creation,
for example, of a rightof claim reduction, aswell as theprovisions relating to
interlocking directorates, represent, inmy judgment, sound legislative pro
posals. It is difficult, however, to find a nexus between such changes and the
ability of theUnited States to compete in internationalmarkets. The relation
ship between a jurisdictional rule of reason and American productivity is also
not

Viewed

as a whole,

the proposed
Act's
is
however,
message
more
concentration
industrial
fairly clear: greater
through mergers,
private
on intellectual
and less private
restraints
enforcement
of the anti
property,
trust laws are
to enhance
American
expected
competitiveness.
obvious.

The jurisdictional rule of reason proposed by the Administration is the
only provision that relates directly to the foreign application of the antitrust
laws. Itwould require federal courts to engage in a balancing of interests
analysis to determine if the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable under the
of the case165.

circumstances

of the international

tension

If enacted,

this provision
the extraterritorial

over

may

ease

perhaps

application

antitrust law, by authorizing courts to dismiss cases thatwould
affect

significant

foreign

interests.

would generally findAmerican
foreign

parties166.

As

well,

There

is, however,

some

of American

evidence

adversely
that

courts

interests to be more compelling than those of

representatives

of

the American

business

com

munity have suggested that the proposed rule of reason would justify certain
restraintson imports to theUnited States and thatAmerican firms should in
fairness be permitted to participate in such conduct without fear of liability167.
There is, in short, some danger that an open-ended jurisdictional test could
precipitate a general deterioration in the international application of competi
trade or commerce with a foreign
nothing contained in this section or any other venue provision applica
shall be construed to prevent dismissal of
suits, actions, or proceedings
"'
action, or proceeding on the ground of forum non convenient.
n.
..."
158) 351 f.
(supra
Repr. in: "Proposals
163
Act of 1987" (sees. 4131 and 4132),
repr. in: "Propo
"Interlocking Directorate
n. 158) 352.
sals ..."
(supra
164
. . ."
Act of 1987" (sees. 4141 and 4142), repr. in: "Proposals
"Merger Modernization
n.
352.
158)
(supra
165See
"Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1987" (supra n. 162).
166L.
to Extraterritorial Application
and Other Reactions
of United
Collins, English
and the Law (supra n. *) 55-64
States Law, in: The United
States, Transnational
Business,
proceeding
nation, and
ble to such
such a suit,

(60).

167"Revised

munity"

under the antitrust laws that involves

Foreign Trade Antitrust Measure
[Article]: Antitrust and Trade Reg. Rep.

Receives

Support
49 (1985) 684-685.

From Business
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significantly
law.
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VII.

to

over

tensions

RabelsZ
restrained

the extraterritorial

import markets,
enforcement
of

International Challenge

America's trading partners may initially be relieved by the diminished
resolve of theUnited States to extend the protection of the antitrust laws
beyond itsborders. They may be particularly satisfiedwith evolving jurisdic
cional
have

that

standards

limit

restraints

foreign
against
a more
sober
provoke
of free commerce
If the benefits
enjoyed
should

ever,

consumers
the protection
American
of trade. Careful
how
consideration,

somewhat

response.
are to be

the waning

fostered,

American

commitment to competitive markets should not signal a general decline in
international

On

resolve.

the contrary,

the burden

of

securing

an

interna

tionalmarketplace largely free of cartelsmust necessarily fallmore heavily on
Three
tools are available:
community.
principal
aggressive
more
en
of national
extensive
laws,
cooperative
competition
an
and
creation
of
international
code.
enforceable
efforts,

the international
enforcement
forcement

1. National

Enforcement

Activities

The growing American acceptance of export and ocean shipping cartels
may have the effectof inducing amore relaxed international attitude towards
such

entities.

Developed

industrial

nations

may

become

more

tolerant

of

each others export cartels, and theUnited States' extraordinary support for
the cartelized ocean liner systemwill surelymake itmore difficult for other
authorities
The

to press

United

States

for competition
has in the past

in the ocean
demonstrated

trades.
some

reluctance

to prose

cute foreign cartelswhich, ifformed by similarly-situated American export
ers,would be legal under theWebb-Pomerene Act168.The more aggressively
theUnited States pursues export promotion policies based on assumptions
about the apparently competitive advantages of cartels, themore difficult it
will be to attack foreign actors seeking the same supposed advantages
through similar conduct directed at theAmerican market. Prosecuting such
foreign conduct would subject theUnited States to the embarrassment of a
168Letter of Assistant
I. Baker to Senator Edward M. Kennedy
Attorney General Donald
to American Export
of February 16, 1977, quoted in: Rahl 262; see "EEC Denies Hostility
Led to Antitrust Suit" [Article]: Antitrust and Trade Reg. Rep.
1981
Trade Associations

No.

1043, pp. A-4

to A-6

(A-4f.).
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also invite foreign retaliation

associations.

export

If other nations responded similarly, refusing to challenge American ex
port cartels to protect their own, then policies of mutual toleration could
promote
flows

of
the re-development
even between
of commerce

international

cartels
controlling
significant
net
nations.
The
industrialized

the major

resultwould be a major shift of economic power to unregulated private
interests.Any national benefits derived from export cartels could be entirely
offset, ifnot outweighed, by the harm inflictedby the export monopolies of
other nations. International economic growth would predictably diminish as
national

and multinational

combines

restricted

nations

engaging

trieswould

in international

trade,

but

to enhance

production

profits. The undesirable economic effectswould

private

likely be experienced by all

the impact

on

coun

developing

be particularly acute, frustrating efforts to establish viable eco

nomies.
If these

are

consequences

to be

prevented,

exemptions

from

the national

competition laws of developed nations for export cartels should be consid
ered unfortunatemanifestations of nationalistic policies which exaggerate the
benefits

of cartels

and

ignore

their

impact

on

other

nations.

Non-cartelized

trade, however, should continue to be pursued by refusing to tolerate foreign
entities

that abuse

domestic

consumers

and

sellers.

such

Although

enforce

ment policies might be considered hypocritical, theybetter serve national and
international

economic

interests

than policies

of reciprocal

toleration.

The decision of theCommission of theEuropean Community to investi
gate wood pulp dealers (including one of the largest American Webb
Pomerene associations) engaging in restrictive practices involving sales
within the EC is encouraging170. Although the EC-Commission
assured
representatives of theUnited States that itwould not treatAmerican export
associations as per se illegal under EC law, it did insist that those having
anticompetitive effectswithin the Community were subject to prosecu
tion171.
The Commission ultimately imposed fines on thewood pulp produc
ers and

their associations'72.

If the trend of currentUnited States policy of greater reliance on cartelized
industries

intended

to enhance

performance

in the international

marketplace

continues, the resolve of theEC to resist such entitieswill play amajor role if
a significant deterioration in the structure of the international economy is to
be avoided.

m

Origman (supra n. 62) 186-188.
170See "EEC Denies
. . ."
Hostility
(supra n. 168).
,7'
Atwood/Brewster, 1986 Cumulative
? 13.13.
Supplement
172Commission
of 19 December
Decision
1984 Relating to a Proceeding

Under

Article

85 of theEEC Treaty (85/202/EEC,IV/29.725-WoodPulp),O.J. EC 1985L 85/1 (14f).
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Enforcement

a

longer

Efforts

American

uniquely

Similar

phenomenon.

laws have been adopted by many, perhaps all, of theworld's major trading
nations173.Although qualified in every nation, the basic commitment to a
economic

competitive

is wide-spread

regime

among

non-Socialist

nations.

This modern development may partially explain theAmerican withdrawal
from

extraterritorial

aggressive

enforcement

of

its antitrust

laws;

it surely

moderates the adverse potential of theUnited State's new attitude. It also lays
the foundation for an international response to the problems of private
through

monopoly

enforcement

cooperative

efforts.

The international community has long recognized the benefits of coopera

tive efforts

to eliminate

restrictive

international

For

trade practices.

example,

the Organization
for Economic Cooperation
and Development
(OECD)174 and theUnited Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD)175 have stressed the value of consultation and coordination of

both

enforcement
ments

efforts.

The

United

to minimize

intended

States

has

the tension

also

created

entered

into bilateral

by American

agree

enforcement

activities through notification and conciliation efforts176.
A framework for
therefore,

cooperation,

currently
national

many
Unfortunately,
to frustrate American
enforcement
have

often

been

used

evidence

however,

exists.
legislative
efforts177,

enactments
and

have

been

intended

the consultative

processes
to attempt
to prevent
national
enforcement178.
There
is,
awareness
sen
American
of foreign
that a growing

sitivities in this area, demonstrated by a willingness to notify concerned
foreign governments about investigations and to explain the basis for the
173See
Fugate ?15.11.
174"Recommendation

Countries

on Restrictive

of

25,
(final) (September
Practices", Booklet 6, pp. 129-132.
175See "The Set of
Multilaterally

C(79)154

Between Member
Concerning
Co-operation
Practices Affecting International Trade", OECD-Doc.
and Restrictive
Business
1979), repr. in: "Anti-Trust

the Council

Business

Agreed Equitable
Principles and Rules for the Control
TD/RBP/CONF/10
Practices", UNCTAD-Doc.
(1980), repr. in:
Anti-Trust
and Restrictive Business Practices I, Booklet 6, pp. 8f.
176E.
theGovernment
of theUnited States of America
and the
g., "Agreement Between
on Antitrust Matters
to Cooperation
of Australia Relating
Government
(June 29, 1982,
and Restrictive Business
Practices
I, Booklet
2, pp. 1-8; Canada
repr. in: Anti-Trust
of Restrictive

Business

inAnti-Trust Matters"
States' "Joint Statement Concerning Cooperation
(Novem
ber 3, 1969), repr. in: ibid. pp. 9-13; Agreement Between
the Government
of the United
to
of the Federal Republic
States of America
and the Government
of Germany Relating

United

Cooperation
Regarding Restrictive Business Practices
(signed June 23, 1976, en
tered into force, September
1976 II1711, repr. in: ibid., pp. 15-19.
11, 1976), BGBl.
177See statutes cited
supra nn. 90 f.
178See
1986 Cumulative
"EEC Denies Hostili
Atwood/Brewster,
?13.13;
Supplement
.. ."
n. 168).
ty
(supra

Mutual
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inquiry, has resulted in a more cooperative foreign posture179.The existing
bilateral

agreements

on

also

cooperation

call upon

non-American

to

parties

respect theUnited States' interest in thepreservation of competitive markets.
For itspart, theUnited States should recognize the strong foreign aversion
to

private

treble-damages

actions180

and

to the extensive

United

States'

dis

covery procedures181. Foreign cooperation would be more likely forthcom
ing if private suits were limited to compensatory damages and discovery
demands more carefully scrutinized than is often the case in purely domestic
proceedings182.On the other hand, the governments of other nations should
appreciate the depth of the traditional American commitment to freermar
kets and the important role thatprivate actions have played as an enforcement

mechanism183. They should also recognize that the foreign sovereign immun
ity, act of state, and foreign government compulsion doctrines (supra, IV)
provide substantial protection for enterprises that foster national policy.
Effective

multinational

enforcement

cooperative

requires

a basic

under

standing that the conduct under investigation is, likepiracy,without redeem
ing value.

As

long

as nation

states

continue

to

employ

cartels as instruments of economic policy, however,
nificant

coordinated

enforcement

will

seriously

or

tolerate

national

it is unlikely that sig

threaten

car

trans-national

tels, at least not those that enhance domestic profit-levels at the expense of
foreign

consumers.

Developmental

and

second-best

economic

policies

(supra, II 2 and 3) will justify protective efforts.Classic private international

cartels,

however,

enforcement. The

should

provoke

multinational

wide-spread

cooperation

for

quinine cartel, for example, found little international
its
prosecution invarious jurisdictions184.
sympathy during

3. Enforceable

The
codes
tional

International

Code

ideal solution is an enforceable international code of conduct. Such
exist, but they lack the force of law185. To
currently
instrument
restrictive
business
regarding
practices

179
Atwood/Brester, 1986 Cumulative
18(1
See Atwood/Brewster II ? 14.19.
181"Restrictive Business
Practices"

Supplement

an interna
change
from an agreement

? 15.02.

Secretariat, UNCTAD
Report by the UNCTAD
on Trade and Develop
in: Proceedings
of the United Nations Conference
TD/122,
ment, Third Session II (1972) 249-252.
182See
Remedy, Report of theCommittee
Garvey, Study of the Antitrust Treble Damage
on
2d Sess. (1984)
of
Serial
No.
House
U.S.
8, 98th Cong.,
Representatives,
thejudiciary,
39-41.
183
Garvey (supra n. 182) 1.
184See
Fugate ?4.2.
185
and Multinational
Business
(1985) 72-76.
J. Kline, International Codes
Doc.
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in principle, such as theUNCTAD
Code186, to an enforceable international
document, like the competition provisions of the EEC Treaty187,would
require extraordinary political efforts. Participating nations would have to
in the very sensitive
surrender
sovereignty
partially
a
unlike
the EEC
tion. Moreover,
Treaty,
binding

area of economic
international

regula
agreement

would have tomediate conflicting interestsbetween developed and develop
ing nations.

A

enforceable

comprehensive,

international

code

competition

is,

therefore,unlikely to be established in the foreseeable future.
There is, however, a more modest possibility thatwould respond to the
most serious threat of an increasingly parochial application of theUnited
antitrust

States'
tels.

the threat

laws:

Government-sanctioned

of development
afresh
cartels
only
occassionally

of

car

international
serve

legitimate

economic interests,but they represent a reality thatwill not soon be abolished
by international
combinations

accord.
involving

Private

cartels,

cartels

permitted

purpose but private gain. When
resources

international

however,
under

international
including
serve no
national
laws,

they achieve and exercise monopoly

are misallocated,

the world's

consumers

power,
are

ex

ploited, and the ability of national political regimes to control domestic
economic

is impaired.

development

The

international

community,

there

fore, should have the resolve to prohibit such entities.
An enforceable prohibition against private international cartels would
surely not eliminate monopoly from the international marketplace. The
unilateral

of multinational
practices
corporations,
Government
the reach of such legal restraints.

beyond

cartels, such as OPEC,

multilateral

for

would
example,
created multinational

be

and private restraints sanctioned through bilateral or

would

agreements

also

escape

condemnation.

Despite its limitations, an international prohibition against private cartels
would serve several important purposes. Itwould fill thevoid created by the
diminished American resolve to apply its antitrust laws extraterritorially, a
policy that once promoted international economic growth and protected
foreign buyers. An enforceable international code would also establish that
the aversion to collective, private, unregulated monopoly isuniversal. Surely
any temptation to engage in such conduct would be diminished by the
existence

of a legally

statement

enforceable

of

international

condemnation.

Finally, favorable experience with the enforcement of a clear and reasonable
standard

would

may

eventually

prompt

more

comprehensive

agreements

that

lead to the elimination of unjustifiable export and import cartels188.

186"Restrictive Business
187Arts. 85 and 86 EEC

Practices"
Treaty.

(supra n. 175).

188See
E.-J. Mestm?cker, Europ?isches Wettbewerbsrecht
unsuccessful
attempts to establish an international regime
n. 4) 494-498.
(supra

(1974) 26 f. (discussing earlier
to control cartels); Petersmann
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Conclusion

laws were

once

a

major

instrument

of interna

tional economic policy. America's economic dominance following World
War II, its resolve to impose the antitrust laws extraterritorially, and the
general acceptance by industrialized Western nations that liberal trade
policies were desirable, contributed to the elimination of international cartels
that had destabilized theworld between the two great Wars. Americans
believed that the antitrust laws were largely responsible for thenation's vital
domestic economy and that the policies embodied in those laws could pro
mote the economic growth and development of other countries as well.
Much of theWestern World seemed to have shared thatview. They adopted
competition laws of theirown and therewas no international outrage as the
Antitrust Division launched its attack on international cartels (supra, IV).
The past decade, however, has witnessed significant changes inAmerican
perceptions about thevalue of antitrustpolicy and its role in the international
economic

order.

antitrust

Modern

enactments

have

accordingly

demon

strated two disturbing tendencies. First, they have largelywithdrawn the
benefits of American antitrust laws from foreign markets. American firms
are now free to exploit foreign buyers as long as they avoid substantial
domestic effects; theymay even be encouraged by the government to do so
through export cartels. Secondly, themodern legislation shows a remarkable
tolerance for cartels. In the international sphere, the economic policy of the
United States has shifted notably from a commitment to the benefits of
competition

to an acceptance

of privately

constrained

trade.

Neither the benefits of aggressive antitrust enforcement nor the potential
harm of the recently-enacted American laws should be exaggerated. The
zealous application of theUnited States' antitrust laws to foreign activities
and to the foreign consequences of domestic conduct did not and will not
insure the existence of free, competitive internationalmarkets. Nor will free
markets neccessarily produce stable and progressive political and social
development. As well, theAmerican interest in foreign conduct is in some
cases simply too attenuated to justify any legal response. The strikingwith
drawal of the United States' antitrust laws from international markets,
however, eliminates a significant barrier to the private acquisition and abuse
ofmonopoly power.
The

waning

American

commitment

to

competitive

international

markets

calls for renewed international efforts to control abusive private business
practices. All nations should remain acutely aware of thedangers of isolation
ist and protectionist economic policies. National efforts to protect domestic
industries from foreign competition, or to penetrate foreign markets with
government-sponsored cartels invite retaliation that can lead theworld into a

This content downloaded from 136.242.148.1 on Tue, 15 Jul 2014 10:01:58 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

436

george

e. garvey

RabelsZ

downward economie spiral. Policies of mutual toleration of export and
import cartelswould shift significant economic power to concerns interested
solely in restricting trade in order tomaximize private profits.Under any of
these circumstances, international wealth would diminish and the world
subjected to the political and social upheaval that often accompanies
diminished

economic

expectations.

The international response to the new American antitrust policy should
have several facets: efforts to eliminate existing tariffand non-tariff barriers
should be intensified; national competition laws should be vigorously
enforced against cartels having prohibited effectswithin the relevant jurisdic
tion;

efforts

enforcement

cooperative

enhanced;

and

an enforceable

interna

tional code against private cartels seriously pursued.
The challenge is great, but the effort is justified by the experience of the
past.

Freer

markets

characterized

by

development

and

are not

national
pose

a panacea;

trade
a threat

barriers
to world

but

an

international

cartels
private
order and peace.
and

economic
would
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